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THE UTILITY OF INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS IN MIGRATORY DIVORCE
ALBERT C. JACOBs*
I. INTRODUCTION
Of late years a number of decisions have dealt with two attempts to control mi-
gratory divorce: first, the injunction against divorce proceedings outside the domicil; 1
second, the declaratory judgment in regard to the effect of a foreign ex parte
divorce.' It thus seems desirable to consider the utility of such relief against so-
called migratory divorces.3 Let us assume a simple fact situation. A man and
a woman marry in State X and there cohabit as husband and wife. After some
years a break-up occurs. One party desires to sever the marriage tie. It may be
that the laws of State X provide no statutory ground for divorce within which he
can effectively fit the case.' The other spouse may not be willing to co~perate.5
*A.B., 1921, University of Michigan; BA., 1923, B.C.L., 1924. M.A., 1927, Oxford. Associate Rro-
Lessor of Law, Columbia University. Co-author of A Research in Family Law (1930). Published Cases
and Materials on Landlord and Tenant (1932); Caset and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (t933).
'Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, r16 N. J. Eq. 2o8, 172 Atd. 505 (x934), (1934) 1a N. Y. Univ. L. Q. REv.
135; Knapp v. Knapp, z2 N. J. Misc. 599, 173 At. 343 (1934); Perlman v. Perlman, 113 N. J. Eq. 3, 165
At. 646 (1933); May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N. Y. Supp. 6o6; Dublin v. Dublin, i5o Misc. 694,
270 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1934); Richnian v. Richman, 148 Misc. 387, 266 N. Y. Supp. 513 (3933), (1934)
34 CoL L REv. 172; Johnson v. Johnson, 146 Misc. 93, 261 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1933), (1933) 33 COL. L
REv. 536, (3933) 28 IL... L REv. 295.
'Henry v. Henry, 104 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 At!. 18 (1928); Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E.
291 (3934). reVg 241 App. Div. 71, 269 N. Y. Supp. 994 (3934); Schneider v. Schneider, 232 App.
Div. 71, 249 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3933); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 365 N. E. 819 (1930),
(3929) 17 CAIF. L REv. 68r, (x930) 43 HAiV. L. REv. 477, (1929) 28 MICH. L. REV. 342, (1929) 14
MINN. L. REv. 96; (1929) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 114; (1928) 38 YALE L J. rIz; see also Somberg V.
Somberg, 263 N. Y. x, x88 N. E. 137 (1933), (1934) 47 Hxv. L. REv. 1o59 (1934); (1934) 8a U. oP
PA. L. REV. 542.
'In regard to migratory divorces, see CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMEILICAN DIvoRcE (1932),
c. V. Cahen, p. 63, distinguishes migratory or evasive divorces from non-resident divorces, that is, il
other than the state of marriage. He comes to the conclusion that not more than three per cent of divorces
are migratory. This figure may be low.
'In regard to the statutory grounds for divorce, see 2 VERimX, AMEJUCAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) 18-7a
As to the lack of correlation between the so-called "natural" grounds for divorce and the statutor)
grounds, see MOWER, FAMiLY DIsoRoAzATION (1927).
'This is not the usual set-up, however. Divorce statistics indicate the extent to which co6peration
present in divorce suits. According to .the eleventh annual report of the United States Department o:
Commerce, Bureau- of Census, on Marriage and Divorce, issued in 3934, the contested divorce eases an
comparatively few, 13.3- percent in 1932, 13.9 percent in 1931, z2.6 percent in 193o , 11.8 percent iz
1929, ir-.7-percent in 1928, 2nd 15..4 percent between z887 and ipo6.
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The first spouse decides to take advantage of the laxer divorce laws of some other
state or country, where perchance there are more statutory grounds for divorce,
where the courts may be more lenient in their divorce administration, and where the
residence requirements are inviting.
With the effect of absolute divorces obtained in other states and countries we are
not primarily concerned. Our law reviews are filled with discussions of the ef-
fectiveness of such decrees.' The American Law Institute in the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws8 has endeavored to deal with these problems. The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 193o approved a Uniform
Divorce Jurisdiction Act.9 But still the ghosts of the Supreme Court cases of Ather-
ton v. Atherton,1° and Haddock v. Haddock.' linger to haunt us. Clarity is lack-
ing. The complexing problems have not been effectively settled. Parties may be
regarded as divorced in one state and yet as married in another. The disparity
between the policies of the various states in regard to the nature of the divorce
action,12 in regard to the various statutory grounds for divorce,"3 in regard to the
requirements of residence, 1 4 and in regard to the recognition of ex parte decrees,
has all added to the confusion. Of late years, the legislatures of some states have
seen fit to relax materially the residential requirements.' New divorce "markets"
have entered the field,
Our interest centers primarily on the spouse who is unwilling to cooperate in
the foreign divorce. Of course, he or she can stand by while the other proceeds
to obtain a final foreign decree without contest, and then, if still desirous of en-
forcing his or her marital rights, can do so in various ways.' 7 To what extent,
* In regard to the residence requirements in the various states, see 2 VERMER, op. cit. supra note 4,
xo6-x13.
'A sampling of the authorities in this fie]d is as follows: Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees
for Divorce, (z9o6) i9 H, v. L. REv. 586; Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARv. L REv. 417;
Greene, Enforcement of Foreign Divorce Decree in New York (1926) -it CORN. L. Q. x41; Harper,
The Validity of Void Divorces (1930) 79 U. oF PA. L. REy. 158; McClintock, Fault as an Element of
Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 YALE L 1. 564.
* RESTATE ENT, CONFt.zc"r OF LAws (1934) S5axo-124, inclusive.
9 9 U. L. A. 133. So far Vermont is the only state to adopt this act. Vt. Laws 1931, No. 45. How-
ever, in 1933 Vermont repealed it, Vt. Laws 1933, No. 38, thus leaving no adopting states.
181 U. S. xS (19o). o1201 U. S. 562 (i9o6).
'
5That is, whether a divorce suit is in the nature of an action in rem or an action in personam.
"See note 4, supra. " See note 6, supra.
'Nev. Sess. Laws 1931, C. 97, §22, p. x6z (six weeks); IDAHO CODE ,tNN. (1932) SS31-7ot (ninety
days); Ark. Acts 1931, No. 71, p. 2ot, (ninety days). See also Squire v. Squire, x86 Ark. 5xi, 54 S. W.
(2d) 281 (1932).
"The popularity'of Paris as a divorce "mecca" seems to have declined since 1927, due to an increase
in the cost thereof and in the residence requirement. See Bates, The Divorce of Americans in France,
supra, p. 322. Mexico seems to have replaced Paris as a foreign divorce haven. Arkansas and other states
have entered into competition with Nevada. See note 15, supra.
For a good picture of the divorce practice in Nevada, Arkansas, etc., see Note (193-) 17 Muof. L.
RF.v. 638. And see Ingram and Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, supra, p. 302.
The divorce rate per x,ooo population in 1932 was 1.28 for the whole United States, but 42.89 for Nevada.
1 For example, where the ex parte divorce has been secured by the husband, the wife, if she so
desires. can immediately bring an action for the maintenance of herself and their children. See Note
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS.
however, can the non-agreeing spouse petition in equity for an injunction to restrain
the other from seeking a divorce outside the domicil? Under what circqmstances
will such an injunction issue? And if such an injunction be granted, how effective
will it be? Or again, suppose that the one spouse has proceeded to' anothei state
or country and there procured an absolute ex parte divorce, and later such spouse
returns to State X. Can the other obtain a declaratory judgment to the effect that
this decree of divorce is void? These problems will be dealt with in order.
To clarify the issues, it is necessary to note certain natural limitations which
are placed upon the scope of this article. In the first place, we are concerned only
with the set-up where one spouse seeks to obtain or obtains a migratory divorce
against the wishes of the other. This materially limits the actual number of cases
with which we must deal."8 In the second place, this article does not purport to
deal extensively with the Constitutional or conflict of laws principles governing the
recognition and effectiveness of ex parte decrees of divorce. In our limited set-up
no question of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution in regard to
migratory divorce is directly involved.19 Furthermore, it must be remembered that
(1930) 43 HAxv. L. REV. 477, 478, n. 7. Also the cases cited in note 1o, intra. Sh'e may sue inde-
pendently for divorce and for alimony. It seems quite well settled that where the husband has brought
the foreign action for divorce and the wife has not appeared, that the latter can obtain alimony at home,
though the theories on which this is done vary. See Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 017
(1894); Toncray v. Tonciay, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977, (19o); cf. Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 2z7,
6a S. B. 181 (19o2)i see JAcoBs, CAsEs AND MATERiALs on DoMEriSc RELxrsONs (1933) 990, n. 4. After
the death of the spouse who has procured .the foreign ex parte divorce, as to whether the other party
may claim rights of dower or of curtesy or the statutory substitute therefor in the property of the deceased,
see Wheeler, The Effect ol Foreign Divorce upon Dower and Curtesy (1927) 25 Mica. L. REv. 487 (1927);
also N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, 587, quoted infra, note 103,
" We have seen, note 3, supra, that not more than three percent of American divorces are of a
migratory character. On this basis, in 1932, there would have been about 4,810 migratory divorces. This
figure is probably low. In 1932 there were 3,989 divorces in Nevada alone, or 56.3 per zoo marriages. We
have seen further, note 5, supra, that approximately 85 percent of our divorces are not contested, from
which we can safely infer, I believe, that in the great majority of cases the divorce was obtained with
the consent of the respondent. In 1932, however, 2,277 of the 3,989 Nevada divorces were at least formally
contested.
"U. S. Cons'r. Art. IV, Si: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state... :'
It seems to be clearly settled that a decree of absolute divorce is entitled to full faith and credit in
the following situations: (i) Where rendered at the domicil of both parties, even though service is by
publication only. REsrATEMENT, CoNFUct oF LAws (1934) Srxo. (2) Where rendered by a court of
the last matrimonial domicil of the spouses, even though one spouse may be domiciled elsewhere at the
time of the decree and service be by publication only. Atherton v. Atherton, supra note 1o; see also
Haddock v. Haddock, upra note x; also RF.sTrATEMENT, supra, 5113b, and Zomment f. (3) Where ren-
dered by a court of the domicil of the complainant spouse only if the defendant is personally served
within the state or appears. See Haddock v. Haddock, supra note xx; REsrATEMENT, upra, S1132 (iii),
and comment d.
The Restatement goes still further and provides, S113: "A state can exercise through its courts juris-
diction to dissolve the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the state and the other is
domiciled outside the state, if (a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state 4s) has consented that
the other spouse acquire a separate home; or (a) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right
to object to the acquisition of such separate home.... This follows Professor Beale's interpretation
of the Supreme Court decisions of Atherton v. Atherton, supra, and Haddock v. Haddock, supra, making
"fault" the determining factor where the divorce is granted in the domicil of one spouse based upon
constructive service on the other. For a criticism thereof, see McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce
372--
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the majority of states will, on the ground of comity, recognize ex parte decrees of
divorce obtained in a state of the domicil of the complaining spouse even though
service on the other was by publication only.20 As far then as the policy of this
large group of states is concerned, where a bona fide domicil2l has been estab-
lished by one spouse in the state of the divorce, this paper is not concerned. Our
interest then is centered around the cases where one spouse seeks to obtain or has
obtained a divorce in another jurisdiction without a bona fide domicil and against
the wishes of the other.
II. THE INJUNCTION RESTMANING DivoRcE PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE DoMCIL22
In developing this aspect of our problem, it is my purpose to consider, first, the
general nature of this type of remedy, second, the factors conditioning its issuance,
and third, its "effectiveness, that is, both in regard to the equity defendant and in
regard to the foreign divorce court. These points will be considered in this otder.2*
A. General Nature of Injunction Restraining Foreign Proceedings
For a long time it has been settled that courts of equity will, under proper con-
ditions, enjoin the bringing of an action in a foreign tribunal.24 The early refusal
of the English Courts of Chancery to grant this type of relief was due to a mis.
jurisdiction (z98) 37 YtA. I I. 564. For a recent case adopting the position of the Restatement, see
Delanoy v. Delanoy, 2x6 Cal. 27, x3 P. (ad) 719 (1932), (1933) 21 CAux. I- REv. 504; Note (1933)
86 A. L. R. 1329.
In our typical set-up, however, none of these problems is involved. Nor does any question of estoppel
appear, the absent spouse in no way having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or having acted in
reliance upon the ex parte decree. See REs-TATEmNT, supra, 0112, 451.
" Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Ad. 684, 920 (1914); see also Ditson v. Ditson, 4 IL L
87 (z856). Contra: People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879); Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 8a, 113 N. E.
841 (1916); see also Haddock v. Haddock, supra note ii.
"
1 Domicil is a jurisdictional fact and is subject to attack. REsTATEMENT, CoNFLcIr OF LAws Siti,
comment a: "A finding of domicil by a court in a divorce proceeding cannot create jurisdiction. Domicil,
like any other jurisdictional fact, is subject to collateral attack in any other state by a party who was
not personally before the court when the decree of divorce was granted..... " Thus, where a divorce
comes before a court of another state, despite a finding of domicil of the plaintiff by the divorce court,
it may be shown by extrinsic proof that the plaintiff was not in fact a bona fide domiciliary of the state
which granted the decree. State v. Cooke, x1o Conn. 348, 148 At. 384 (1930).
"Much has been written on the subject of the injunction against foreign proceedings. For a sampling"
of the authorities, see Mesner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing
of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State (1930) 14 Mas'. L. REv. 494, 495-506; Poond, The
Progress of the Law-Equity (1920) 33 HAxv - REV. 420, 425-428; Foster, The Place of Trial in Civil
Actions (1930) 43 HsAiv. L REv. 1217, 1240-1248; 2 STOXY, EQUITY JuRIsPR DENCE (x4 th ed, 1918)
SS122.1-T725" the following notes --,A mmnts: (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 360; (919) 33 HAtv. L. REv.
92; (1922) 35 HAIv. L REv. 61o; (1932) 31 Mfcnl-. L. REv. 88; (1933) 31 MICIL L. Rv. 963; (1924)
72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 429; (1930) 39 YAxE L J. 719; (1921) 1o GEo. I. 47-
" Wherever possible the discussion will be limited to the fact-sltuation before us. In many instances,
however, it will be necessary to argue by analogy from injunctions against other types of proceeding.
This latter type has become common. There are not many reported cases, however, dealing with the
injunction restraining divorce proceedings, and with one exception, all have issued from New Jersey and
New York. See notes 5o, si, infra.
a2 S-owy, toe. cit. supra note 22.
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apprehension of the nature thereof.2 5 With a better understanding of such in-
junctions the jurisdiction of the equity courts to grant them became firmly estab-
lished both in England2" and in America. 7 It has frequently been pointed out
that the injunction does not interfere with the sovereignty of the other state or
country; that it is a decree in personam directed to the parties to the suit.28  With
this view the overwhelming weight of American authority is in accord. It has
definitely been settled that the granting of such an injunction does not violate the
full faith and credit clause, 29 or the interstate privileges and immunities clause 0
of the Federal Constitution.31 Furthermore, the courts have deemed it no violation
of the principles of comity to interfere with the bringing of certain suits in other
jurisdictions.3 2  "The theory upon which the courts act, in granting this relief, is
that they have authority to control the persons within the territorial limits of the
State, and, having jurisdiction of the parties, can render a decree which the parties
are bound to respect and obey, even beyond the territorial limits of the State."38
B. Factors Conditioning the Use of this Type of Injunction
To understand the basis of the injunction against outside action, it is necessary
to consider the appropriate forum in which to bring a civil suit. In other words,
what is the normal place to try a case: is it [i] the .residence of the plaintiff; [ii] the
'In one of the earliest reported cases, Love v. Baker, 2 Freeman Ch. 125, r Ch. Cas. 67 (x665), it
was held that an injunction did not lie to stop a suit at Leghorn.
m Wharton v. May, 5 Ves. Jr. 27 (799); Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297 (t8ar). In Portarlington
v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104 (1834), the chancellor, Lord Brougham, stated, at p. so8: "In truth, nothing
can be more unfounded than the doubts of the jurisdiction. That is grounded, like all other jurisdiction
of the Court, not upon any pretension to the exercise of judicial and administrative rightt abroad, but on
the circumstance of the person of the party on whom this order it made being within the power of the
Court." [Italics author's.]
"See Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890).
'Bigelow, C. J., in Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen (86 Mass.) 545 (186a); "In the exercise of ihis power,
courts of equity proceed, not upon any claim of right to interfere with or control the course of proceedings
in other tribunals,- or prevent them from adjudicating on the rights of the parties when drawn in
controversy and duly presented for their determination. But the jurisdiction is found on the clear author-
ity vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits. of their jurisdiction and amenable to
process, to restrain them from doing acts which will work wrong and injury to others, and are therefore
contrary to equity and good conscience."
'Art. IV, Ji, quoted, supra note xg.
"Art. IV, Sa(s). "The citizens of each'state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states:'
" Cole v. Cunninghim, supra note 27, where it was held not to be a denial of full faith and credit
to New York judicial proceedings for a Massachusetts court, on the application of a resident thereof, to
enjoin another Massachusetts resident from prosecuting in New.York a garnishment action already com-
menced there, in evasion of the laws of their domicil. For a challenge of the soundness of the doctrine
of this case, see Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Act (1929) 24 Ia. L. REv.
383, 408.
"Comity between the states and public policy were the reasons early advanced for the refusal of a
few American courts to interfere, even in this indirect manner, with proceedings in the courts of sister
states. See Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N. C. 329 (1833); Mead v. Merritt, a Paige 402 (N. Y. 1831).
UMesner, supra note.22, at 495; see also Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877); a SToRY, 10C. cit. supra
note 22.
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residence of the defendant, or [iii] the place where the transaction happened? -'
In regard to civil cases in general, we start with the recognition of the common law
attitude that a plaintiff ordinarily may sue in whatever state has jurisdiction of the
defendant. We are confronted, however, with another equally broad and general
principle, namely, that equity will prevent the unconscionable enforcement of a
legal right. Were our problem to consider the injunction against an ordinary suit
in a foreign state, th'at is, a suit which normally could be maintained there by a non-
resident, it would be necessary to consider at what point will be reconciled the com-
"peting considerations of policy behind these two general principles. For instance,
would equity enjoin the institution of a suit at a place other than the normal place,
as a matter of course? We are dealing, however, in our particular fact set-up,
with the injunction against divorce proceedings. Jurisdiction to grant divorce de-
pends upon domicil,35 at least domicil of one of the spouses36 Many other types
of litigation often enjoined can be maintained by non-residents-not so with divorce,
where domicil of one spouse is necessary to sustain jurisdiction. Technically, there-
fore, the problem of the proper forum looms less large here than it does in the
ordinary civil case.3 7 Theoretically at least, the choice of the proper forum is nar-
rowed materially. Until there is a change of domicil of one or both spouses, there
can be only one appropriate tribunal, the only state interested in the proceedings.38
Particularly will the matrimonial domicil consider itself the proper court. Where
the spouses become domiciled in different states, there will perchance be competing
claims as to the appropriate divorce forumn.
When then will an injunction against foreign proceedings be grainted? Pound4"
has given us perhaps the most lucid classification of the situations. First, when the
foreign court has no jurisdiction, but the threatened judgment there would em.
barrass the equity plaintiff in the assertion of his or her rights.&l Second, where ion-
current litigation between the same parties over the same subject matter is in prog-
"For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Foster, The Place of Trial in 'Civil Actions
(1930) 43 HAzv. L. REv. 1217; Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of
Adjustment (1930) 44 HAxv. L. REv. 42; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
American Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. a; Dainow. The Inappropriate Forum (1935) 29 ILL. L Rav. 867.
wRESTArmMEwr, CoNr.Lcr oF LAws, §zss: "A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to
dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is domiciled within the state."
Compare Sz 2: "The validity of a divorce decree cannot be questioned in a proceeding concerning
any right or other interest arising out of the marital relation, either by a spouse who has obtained such
decree of divorce from a court which had no jurisdiction, or by a spouse who takes advantage of such
a decree by remarrying."
"See rote Y9, supra. Compare, however, Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923),
where a French divorce, based on adultery, between Americans domiciled in New York but long resident
in France was recognized in New York on the ground of comity.
'
7 Of course, one spouse can always establish a bona fide domicil in another state and after satisfying
the residence requirements there prescribed by statute, proceed to a divorce. As to the recognition of
such a decree elsewhere, see note 19, supra.
" See note 21, supra, to the effect that domicil is a jurisdictional fact.
"See Ditson v. Ditson supra note 2o.
"Pound, The Progress of the L.aw-Equity (192o) 33 HAxv. L. Rv.'420, 425-428.
"Id. at 426. In this group is put the injunction restraining foreign aivorce proceedings.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ress or is threatened.42  Third, where there is an attempt to reach exempt property
of a domestic debtor by means of an action outside the state.43  Beyond this it is
difficult to go. Just what constitutes a proper case for the exercise of such power has
never been adequately answered. 4
Returning now to the injunction restraining foreign divorce proceedings, in
Johnson v. Johnson . 5 Heffernan, J., said:"'
"The question, however, as to when this jurisdiction may be exercised is often one of
great delicacy, owing to the fact diat it may frequently lead to a conflict of jurisdiction.
Hence the power is used sparingly, and the applicant must show good equitable grounds4T
"Ibid.: "In some of the cases of this type there was simply a vexatious multiplicity of actions. (French
v. Hay, 22 Wal. (U. S.) 250 (1874)]. Here courts were cautious about interposing. [Burgess v. Smith,
2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y. 276, a8o (1847)] In others, one court was not in as good a position to do complete
justice as another. [See Harris v. Pullman, 84 Il. 20 (1876)]. In still others, the defendant was seek-
ing to obtain an inequitable advantage over other creditors by means of concurrent litigation abroad.
[Cole v. Cunningham, note 27, supra]."
"Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516 (1874).
Pound. supra note 40, at 427: "To these (the above three types of cases] some courts are adding a
fourth: Cases where the foreign court has jurisdiction, in which there is no concurrent litigation or
vexatious multiplicity of action, and in which there is no attempt to reach anything which the policy of
the local legislation seeks to secure to.the plaintiff, but in which a domestic creditor seeks to sue a
domestic debtor, as he has full legal power io do, in another state, where the latter has property, because
of a more favorable procedure or more favorable viewI as to what is a defense in the latter jurisdiction."
To these should we possibly add a fifth-.!'Forum non convenien"?
"RESTA 'F-EN, CoNFLICT OF LAws S96: "A state can exercise-through is zourts jurisdiction to forbid
a party, who is subject to its jurisdiction, to do an act in another state."
Comment a: " . . . Whether a decree of this character will be rendered depends upon the principles
of equity jurisprudence as understood and developed by the courts of the forum and is no part of the
Restatement of this subject It may be stated, however, that when acts are threatened which subject the
plaintiff to irreparable damage or when the balance of convenience and fairness require, such a decree
will readily be issued."
"Supra note z. In -an action for separation on the ground of abandonment and for separath main.
tenance the wife sought permanently to enjoin her husband from instituting legal proceedings for divorce
in Nevada or in any other jurisdiction. The spouses had resided in New York for ten years. The
defendant was served in New York and failed to deny that he had none of the legal grounds for divorce
and that he intended to set up a fictitious residence elsewhere to secure a divorce on grounds not recog-
nized in New York. Held, a temporary injunction granted, -restraining him from prosecuting a divorce
action in any other jurisdiction.
" Supra note a, at 95.
'See Dehon v. Foster, '86 Mass. 545, 551 (x862)..
Cf. Note (1933) 31 MicH. L REv. 88: "It is frequently said that it will be exercised but sparingly,
and then only when a clear equitable right is established by the petitioner. This, in spite of the strong
language commonly accompanying such statements, is no more than that which the court requires for
the issuance of any injunctional decree. The same equitable principles upon which is bised the isspance
of an injunction elsewhere are equally controlling hem'
Id. at 92: "It may be suggested that what have been termed 'delicate considerations involved in inter-
fering with legal proceedings in other states,' are of no aid in arriving at a decision, and should be dis-
carded as merely producing additional confusion in an already ilifficult problem. ... The true bas
... should involve only an application Of the usual equitable principles."
Pound, supra note 40, at 426: "Undoubtedly a state may coerce its citizens not to sue abroad, It
does not follow, however, that its courts of equity have jurisdiction to do so in every case, or that they ought
to exercise such jurisdiction in every case where it exists. We have to ask: What are the legal rights of
the plaintiff in equity, defendant abroad, and are the legal remedies which are open to him adequate to
maintain those rights? We have then to ask: is the injustice and hardship upon the plaintiff such as to
make it expedient for equity to act, in view of the delicate considerations involved in interfering with
legal proceedings in other vtates?"
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or the injunction will not issue. The jurisdiction rests on the authority vested in courts
of equity over persons within-the limits of their own jurisdiction to restrain them from
doing inequitable acts to the wrong and injury of others, and on the power of the State
to compel its own citizens to respect its laws even beyond its own territorial limits. All
that is necessary to sustain the jurisdiction is that the plaintiff should show a clear equity
and that the defendant is subject to the authority and within reach of the process of the
court, and this requirement is satisfied when it is shown that the institution of the suit
in another state is for the purpose of securing to the plaintiff some unfair, unconscionable
or inequitable advantage, or that the prosecution thereof will result in fraud, gross wrong
or oppression, and that the prosecution of the suit in another state is against equity and
good conscience, or that the suit is against the public policy of the state in whose court
the injunction is sought.48 The most frequent ground for granting an injunction of this
character is to prevent a citizen of one state from prosecuting an action against another
citizen of the same state for the purpose of avoiding the laws of his own state.u40
The courts of New Jersey,50 New York,5 1 and Rhode Island 2 have issued
injunctions restraining foreign divorce proceedings. The statutory grounds for
divorce in New Jersey and New York are set forth in the footnotes.58
An analysis of the-reported cases where an injunction has been granted restrain-
ing foreign divorce proceedings shows that the issuance thereof has beea based on
one or more of three principal grounds. First, the foreign divorce would involve
an evasion of the laws of the domicil or of a strong domestic policy. In.this, as in
other fields, ordinarily where the purpose of the foreign suit is to evade the laws of
"Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1926), (1927) 1 Mrs. L. R Z.
467, Dowling, J., at p. x12: "This jurisdiction of the courts of our state has been exercised repeatedly in
matrimonial cases. This State has settled as its adjudged policy to refuse to recognize as binding a decree
bf divorce obtained in'a court of a sister State, not the matrimonial domicil, upon grounds insufficient
for that purpose in this State, when the divorced defendant resided in this State and was not personally
served with process and did not appear in the action- . ..
"To protect the citizens of this State in their rights, it is not necessary that the offending litigant
should be allowed to carry through his scheme of evasion of the laws of his own State to a successful
completion, and leave the aggrieved party to defend his rights against such a judgment, so fraudulently
obtained, when it is set up in some proceeding here."
For recent applications of this policy, see Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. 1. 680 (193o),
(931) 30 MICH. L REv. 285;'Lcfferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933).
For New York policy where the divorce defendant is not a New York resident, see Ball v. Cross, 231
N. Y. 329, X32 N. E. xo6 (1921); (192a) 31 YALE L J. xgs; Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 249 N. .
844 (1925); (1926) 39 Haxv. L Rv. 640.
*See Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48, at 115.
'Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq. 94, 43 Ad. 97 (1899); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N. J. Eq.
- 563, 41 Ad. 876, 43 Atl. 683, 630 (1899), a0'd x81 U. S. x79 (x9ox); Huettinger v. Huettinger, 43 Ad.
574 (N. J. x899); Miller v. Miller, 66 N. J. Eq. 436; 58 Ad. x88 (1904); Von Bermuth v. Von Bernuth,
76 N. J. Eq. 177, 73 Ad. 1049 (igog); Perlman v. Perlman, supra note x; Knapp v. Knapp, supra note 2;
Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, supra note r.
"Forrest v. Forrest, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. x8o (N. Y. x85o); Kittle v. Kittle, 8 Daly 72 (N. Y. 1878);
Gwathmy v. Gwathmey, xx6 Misc- 85, x9o N. Y. Supp. 199 (i92); arf'd 2ox App. Di. 843, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 935 (1922); Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48; Johnson v. Johnson, supra note z; Dublin v.
Dublin, Jupra note a; Richman v. Richman, supra note x.
Injunction denied: May v. May, supra notex. .
IBorda v. Borda, 44 R. 1. 337, I17 AdL 36a (a922).
'eNew Jersey: Adultery, Coup. S-TAT. (1910) p. 2023, S2; Cruelty, CUa. SueV. (1924) p. 98%,
56 2-3a; Desertion, for two years, CoMp. STrAT. (1910) p. 2023, S3; p. 2041, 631.
New York: Adultery, Ctr. Pxc. Acr (Cahill, x5) Six-47.
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the domicil, an injunction will be granted.5 4 Especially is this true of suits for
divorce. The state of the domicil takes a peculiar interest in the preservation of
the marital status. It does not allow the parties by private contract to alter the
normal incidents thereof or to arrange for a divorce. " Many of the New York
cases proceed on this ground."  With a strict divorce law such as New York and
with a policy against the recognition of ex parte decrees, 1 it is not surprising to find
there a relatively large number of injunctions against foreign divorce.
Second, many cases proceed on the basis of undue hardship, of the threatened
foreign divorce proceeding on the equity defendant.5 8 The situation facing the
equity plaintiff has been well described by Pitney, V. C., in Kempson v. Kempson:5'
"She is in this predicament-she must either (i) go to the trouble and expense of
appearing generally in the Dakota court to resist her husband's claim, 0 or (a) she must
attempt to appear specially for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court by
showing his real domicil to be in New Jersey. Either of these defences involves great
labor and expense on her part.6l The only other course open to her is, in substance, to
allow judgment by default to go against her there, and attack the decree when attempted
to be enforced in this State. Now, if she adopts the first remedy and appears in that
court, it will, by that appearance, have obtained jurisdiction of her person and undoubted
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, as the case then will be brought within the
'Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 6o, 37 Adt. 372 (1897).
Foster, supra note 22, at 1241: "The principal reason for issuing injunctions is fear that the foreign
court will not decide the issue properly, and conviction that the home state has a strong interest in having
the.issue determined according to its own views."
In regard to collusion, see i VEaMEY, op. dr. supra note 4, 75-77.
" (193a) 31 MIcH. L RBv. 88, 93: "It is generally said that where a suit in a foreign jurisdiction
would result in an evasion" of a strong domestic policy, such will be enjoined. . . . Hence, a decree has
generally issued either where one spouse seeks a divorce abroad and proceeds without complying with the
laws of the foreign state, or where the decree otherwise would not be effective in the domiciliary state."
See Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, supra note 51.
= See Greenberg. v. Greenberg, supra note 48; Forrest v. Forrest supra note 5z; Kitde v. Kittle, supra
note 5!.
N Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 50; von Bernuth v. von Bernuth, supra note so; Perlman v. Perl-
man, supra note x; Forrest v. Forrest, supra note 5x; Kittle v. Kittle, supra note 5z; Greenberg v. Green-
berg, supra note 48; Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, supra note 51; Johnson, v. Johnson, supra note x; Richman
v. Richman, supra note z.
o58 N. J. Eq. 94, 95, 43 At. 97 (1899).
v Kittle v. Kittle, supra note. 51, Daly, C. J., said in regard to a separation suit brought by the husband
in Connecticut during the pendency of a similar suit brought by the wife in New York on the same
grounds: "The plaintiff swears that it is the intention of the defendant to bring the action in Connecticut
to trial before it will be possible for the cause to be tried over again in this court, and that it will not
be in her power to give evidence in defence of that action, as all her witnesses reside in this state, except
two, who reside at Hoboken in New Jersey, and that being wholly without means, she can neither pay
the expense that would be incurred by having their testimony taken by a commission in this state, nor
pay their-expenses in going from this state to Connecticut, as witnesses, to testify in her behalf. . . .
"The plaintiff is helpless as respects the suit in Connecticut. It is not in her power to defend it, and
Judgment may be there-rendered against her through her inability to make any defence from want of
testimony. Full and ample justice can be done to the defendant in this suit."
' Johnson v. Johnson, supra note i, p. 95: "Undoubtedly plaintiff by employing counsel and appearing
in foreign court could defeat defendant's attempt to obtain a decree against her. To resist such an attack
upon her marriage she would be required to appear and make her defense in some remote foreign
forum chosen by defendant. This course would also necessitate the expenditure of considerable money.
and plaintiff pleads that she is penniless, in delicate health and incumbered by two small children."
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authority of the case of Fairchild v. Fairchild, 8 Dick. Ch. Rep. 678,82 as the decree of that
court will be binding upon her.63 As to the second course, namely, a special .ppearance
for the purpose of attacking the jurisdiction, it is common knowledge that the courts of
Dakota assume jurisdiction of non-resident defendants based on a residence on the part
of the plaintiff which falls far short of amounting to an actual domicil. In fact, they
are satisfied with a mere temporary residence adopted for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, and without any animus manendi; so that, if she should appear specially, the task
of satisfying the court that her husband was not a bona fide domiciled resident of the
State would be well-nigh hopeless. 64 If she takes the remaining course, and fails entirely
to appear, and allows a decree to go against her, she will be in the situation of a divorced
wife, who must bring a suit to set aside the decree of divorce and enforce her rights
against her husband, who may avoid personal service in this jurisdiction. This is a hard-
ship to which it seems to me the husband has no right in equity to subject her."6 5
Third, many cases base the injunction against foreign divorce upon the ground
of fraud.6 6 That is, the equity plaintiff alleges that the equity defendant has no.
intention of establishing a bona fide domicil in the divorce state; that therefore a
fraud is about to be perpetrated upon ihe court of that State, and upon the equity
petitioner. Particularly is this true of the New Jersey cases.
" Fairchild v. Fairchild, 53 N. J. Eq. 678, 34 Ad. io (z896). Husband's divorce obtained in Kansas,
wife appearing, held a defense to wife's suit for separate maintenance; that the bona fides of the husband's
residence could not be questioned in New Jersey, in the absence of fraud.
"Suppose the wife appears to contest her husband's suit and loses, could she later attack such decree
in the state of her domicil? In Schneider v. Schneider, 232 App. Div. 71, 249 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1935),
she was not allowed a declaratory judgment that her husband's French divorce was void. See note 163,
infrL
RESTATEMENT, CONFLCr OF LAws, S451: "A party appearing and participating in a court of any state
will be precluded from questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his person in any subsequent pro-
ceeding in that state, or in any other state if the court in which he appeared purported to render a .judg-
ment against him."
Caveat: "The Institute expresses no opinion whether and how far a party appearing and participating
in the proceedings in a court of any state is precluded from subsequently questioning the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action in the courts of that state or any other state if the cout
in which he appeared purported to render a judgment against him."
Illustration: "A sues B in Nevada for divorce. B enters an appearance and pleads that neither A nor
B is domiciled in Nevada. The court finds thai A is domiciled in Nevada and renders a decree of divorce
against B. Subsequently B sues A in Illinois for a divorce. A pleads the Nevada decree. The caveat
leaves open the effect of the Nevada decree."
See, however, Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (19o2). White, J., "Nor is there force in the
suggestion that because, in the case before us, the wife appeared, hence the South Dakota court had
jurisdiction to decree the divorce."
"See note xa5, infra.
'See Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48, at 1ra.
"Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra note 5o; Huettinger v. Huettinger, supra note 5o; Kempson v. Kemp-
son, supra note 56; Perlman v. Perlman, supra note s; Knapp v. Knapp, supra note x; Di Brigidia v.
Di Brigidia, supra note x; Forrest v. Forrest, stupra note 51; Dublin v. Dublin, supra note z.
"Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, supra note z. The husband had secured a Nevada decree for cruelty
occurring in New Jersey. The wife, served with process in New Jersey, did not appear. The divorce was
set up as a defense to the wife's suit for support and maintenance. Wife's replication alleged fraud in
procuring the decree, because there had been no bona fide domicil in Nevada. During the pendency of
the husband's divorce action, the wife had instituted a suit for support, 'the husband being personally
served in Nevada with the complaint and an order restraining him from proceeding with the divorce.
No notice of this was given to the Nevada court. Held, the divorce was void, as it was secured by fraud
going to the jurisdiction. "And yet, knowing that during the whole jteriod he sojourned in Nevada, he
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It is generally stated that for an injunction to issue, both parties must be resident
of the enjoining State.6 Hence, even in regard to an ordinary transitory cause o
action, if either the equity plaintiff69 or defendant ° is a non-resident, as a genera
rule, no injunction will issue. Due to the peculiarities of divorce jurisdiction,71 ihi
applies with far greater force to the injunction against foreign divorce proceedings
If the equity petitioner is not a resident of the state, no injunction should issue t(
restrain the divorce proceedings.7 2 It is only on the basis of residence and citizen
ship that he is entitled to the protection of its marital laws.73  Similarly, in thi
absence of residence and domicil of the equity defendant, an injunction would seen
to be useless.74 In all but one case"5 where the injunction restraining divorce hai
was, nevertheless a resident of New Jersey, he intentionally concealed from the Nevada court the fact tha
this court had restrained him from pr6ceeding. This being so, it is manifest that he procured the ad-
judication of the Nevada court on the question of his domicile by fraud."
See also Miller v. Miller, supra note 50; Knapp v. Knapp, upra note i; Huettinger v. Huettinge,
jupra note s5o.
'Note (1932) 31 Mi cs. L. Rrv. 88, 95, discusses the general situation: "It might be said . . . unlest
both parties are residents of the state in which the injunction is sought, relief will usually be refused.
This would not seem to lead to an untoward or unjust result. Where there is real hardship in being sued
abroad, or if the action is being brought for the purpose of vexation, an appeal may always be made te
the foreign court. In the case" where 'evasion of domestic policy' is alleged, if the plaintiff be not a
cizen he has iio right to the protection afforded by the policy, and if the defendant is a stranger he it
not bound by it."
- The great majority of American decisions have held that a~n injunction against suit in another
s~te will not be granted to a non-resident. American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. W. 1117
(x916). Contra: Busby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297 (18a).
"Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. 71, 13 S. W. 733 (890). Mesner, supra note a, at 499, suggests
that the lack of power of. the courts to enforce a decree against a non-resident should not alone be ta
sufficient reason for their refusal to act, as he could be required to put up a bond, or, if he has local
property, it could be sequestered. He submits, however, that this is not a matter of jurisdiction at all,
"but merely a refusal to act in such a situation because, on grounds of comity, the power of one state to
interfere with. a litigant, who is in due course pursuing his rights and remedies in the courts of another
state, ought to be sparingly exercised. When one of the parties is a non-resident, the reason for granting
the injunction on the grounds of convenience of witnesses, expense, evasion of the laws of the domicl,
and other grounds commonly invoked will mostly likely be lacking, but, if the proper case is shown,
there does not seem to be any objection to granting such relief, even in case one of the parties is a non-
resident, provided he is subject to the jurisdiction of the court."
"See note 19. upa.
"In all the reported cases, we have found the equity plaintiff to be a resident of the enjoining state.
"Thus New York will frequently recognize an ex parle divorce obtained against a non-resident
which would not be recognized as against a resident. See Ball v. Cross; Dean v. Dean, jupra note 48.
S'See Note (1933) 28 ILL. L Ray. 295, 296: "The basis of such an injunction is the power to compel
a citizen to continue obeying the laws of his own state, although beyond its territorial limits. %nce a state
has no recognized power either to prevent a change of domicil or to compel a former citizen to continue
obeying its laws after a change of domicil, such an injunction depends for its effectiveness upon the con-
tinued domicil of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the restraining court. The ordinary action in
a foreign court, restrained by injunction, is one which the defendant could maintain without removing his
domicil from the jurisdiction of the enjoining court. A divorce action, however, can only be prosecuted
in the court of a foreign state by a removal of domicil to that state, and between sister states a change
of domicil constitutes a change of citizenship."
"Borda v. Borda, upra note 52. And here the facts were peculiar. The husband petitioned for
divorce in Rhode Island; the wife filed a cross-petition asking for divorce. The husband did not prosecute
his petition, but after the filing of his wife's motion sought leave to discontinue, which was not permitted.
Prior to the hearing the husband was enjoined from prosecuting a proceeding for divorce which he had
instituted in Porto Rico after the filing of his petition and the rpotion of the wife. The divorce was
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been granted, the equity defendant was a domiciled inhabitant of the enjoining
State. In a number of cases the equity defendant has claimed the acquisition of a
new domicil, which was not recognized by enjoining court.7 6  In some cases the
equity defendant admitted that his domicil remained unchanged. 7 ' If the equity
defendant honestly intends to establish a permanent domicil elsewhere, it would
seem that he should not be enjoined from divorce proceedings. In such cases it has
been said that the burden of going forward with the evidence rests on the de-
fendant. 78 Quaere whether this would be so with a state having a divorce policy
similar to New York.76
Will an injunction be granted where the equity defendant cannot be served
within the state? Where this is impossible the New York courts have refused a
divorce injunction.8 0  This -has been due to the belief that contempt proceedings
could not be based upon foreign service8 " In all the New York cases where such
an injunction has been granted there has been service on the equity defendant within
the State. 2 This position seems entirely justified in view of the nature of the
granted the wife and was affirmed on appeal. Sweetland, C. J., at p. 339: "The exact domicil of the
petitioner at the time of filing his petition is somewhat uncertain. He clearly was not a domiciled in-
habitant of Rhode Island. The p itioner being without a domidl in this state was obliged to rely upon
the domicil of his wife in order to give the Superior Court jurisdiction over his petition for divoree."
"Dublin v. Dublin, supra note i. Defendant husband claimed that he had established a domicil in
Pennsylvania and was entitled to bring divoriZ proceedings there. Held, wife entitled to injunction.
Horton, J., at p. 695: "Whether it (the court) will exercise its power (to enjoin) in this case depends
entirely upon whether defendant's domicil is in the state of New York or in the State of Pennsylvania."
At pp. 696-7: "Upon the evidence the court is compelled to find that the defendants' alleged
domicil in Erie (Pennsylvania) was not and was not intended -to be his permanent home; that it was
pretense only and is sought to be established by him in bad faith and for the purpose only of giving him
a colorable right to maintain his action for divorce against his wife."
See also Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, supra note s; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra note 50; Di Brigidia
v. Brigidia, supra note 67.
't Johnson v. Johnson, supra note x. The defendant husband appeared, but did not answer or make
any denial of the plaintiffs allegations that he was domiciled in New York; he admitted his -intention of
establishing a fictitious residence elsewhere. See also Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48.
"Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 5o, at 98; Huettingdr v. Huettinger, supra note 50, at 575-
Suppose a New York marriage; the husband leaves the wife without cause; he goes to California
where he lives for five years, and then sues for divorce on a ground not recognized in New York. The
wife, continuing her New York residence, seeks an injunction restraining the California divorce proceed-
ing. Assuming service on the husband in New York, would the injunction issue? Would such a divorce
be recognized in New York? "May v. May, supra note x.
' Ibid. Husband sued for separation on 'he ground of abandonment, the summons and complaint
being served on the wife in Nevada. Shortly thereafter the husband obtained an ex parte osder directing
the wife to show cause why she should not be enjoined from seeking a divorce or separation from the
plaintiff in Nevada. This order was also served in Nevada. Upon the return day of the motion, the
defendant wife appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction of the court. "We are further of the opinion
that the court at Special Term also improperly granted the motion for injunctive relief. While it is true,
of course, that the court has power to enjoin one served within the state from prosecuting an action
in another jurisdiction, and that such relief, if granted here, would be in furtherance of the court's
power to adjudicate in respect to the res, it would be a mere futile gesture under the circumstances here
presented. There could be no contempt predicated upon the service of such an order without the jurisdic-
tion. Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256 N. Y. 406, 176 N. E. 8ao (193) ... . " O'Malley, J., at p. 521.
'Forrest v. Forrest, supra note 51; Kittle v. Kittle, supra note 51; Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, supra
note 51; Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48; Johnson v. Johnson, supra note x; Richmaa v. Richman,
supra note x; Dublin v. Dublin, supra note i.
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divorce injunction. Different is the practice of the New Jersey courts.8 3  there
such an injunction will issue after foreign service, even though the equity defendant
has been continuously absent from the State.84 The leading New Jersey decision
upon the point is Kempson v. Kempson.85  Suit had been filed in New Jersey to
enjoin complainant's husband from proceeding with a divorce in North Dakota.
The injunction had been granted. In the Court of Errors and Appeals 6 the con-
troversy arose over the attachment of the defendant for contempt in violating the
order-he attacked the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court. It had been alleged
by the complainant (who was at all times domiciled in New Jersey) that the de-
fendant was at all times a resident of New Jersey; but he was not in New Jersey
at the time of the injunction proceedings, though he was given notice of them and
was served with them in New York. It was held, that the court had jurisdiction;
that the injunction was properly granted. 7 The court proceeded on the ground
that the bases for this action need be only the same as the bases for divorce; that
both kinds of actions involve a "res." Hence, as New Jersey was the domicil of the
plaintiff and the matrimonial domicil, its courts had jurisdiction 88 The New
Kempson v. Kempson, supra note So; von Bernuth v. von Brnuth, supwa note 5o (service upon the
defendant husband was in New York); Perlman v. Perlman, supra note x (service of the restraining order
made upon the defendant husband in Nevada); Knapp v. Knapp, supra note i (service of order made
in New York); Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, supra note z (service of the injunction made upon the
defendant husband in Nevada).
" Ip Knapp v. Knapp, supra note z, the husband deserted his wife in New Jersey and went to New
York, the wife continuing her New Jersey residence. Later the wife was served with process in a suit
for divorce against her in Mexico.- Whereupon this application was made for an injunction restraining
her husband from prosecuting such a suit in Mexico. No service was effected upon the defendant in
New Jersey, but an order wascrnade requiring the defendant to appear, which order was served personally
upon him in New York. He failed to appear. Held, plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.
MSupra note -5o. The wife asked the court to restrain her husband from further proceeding with his
divorce suit begun against her in North Dakota on the ground of cruelty, not then a ground for divorce in
New Jersey. Service of the complaint and summons in the divorce suit was made upon the complainant in
New Jersey. The wife alleged that the husband's allegation of residence in the North Dakota divorce
complaint was fraudulent. She asked for custody of the children of the marriage. An injunction was
issued pending this suit in regard to the custody and maintenance of the children. The order contained
leave to serve it on ti-' defendant wherever he might be found. The injunction was served upon the de-
fendant personally in New York.
Kempson v. Kempson, 6z N. J. Eq. 303, 48 Ad. 244 (19os). The husband, in spite of the injunction,
obtained the divorce in North Dakota. After his remarriage, he returned to New Jersey, and the wife
sought to charge him with contempt. The question arose as to the effectiveness of the service of the
order. "With regard tb the actual service of the' writ out of the jurisdiction: It seems to be well settled
that it is a matter of no consequence how the fact of the issuing of the injunction is brought to the
knowledge or notice of the defendant. If he has notice or knowledge of it, his cobscience bound, and
he is liable to the consequences-of its breach to the same extent as if it has been actually served upon
him in writing. The (New Jersey) authorities abundantly sustain the position that the service of an
injunction may be made without the jurisdiction, and that mere knowledge by the party of the existence
of the injunction is iufficient, without any actual service, to put him in contempt for its violation ...
I therefore conclude that the injunction was served. But besides that, there is abundant evidence in
the case that he had notice, from something more reliable than mere rumor, ... of the existence of the
injunction." Pitney, V. C., at p. 310.
- Kempson v. Kempson, 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Ad. 36o, 625 (1902).
WIn regard to the modification of the decree in attachment prodeedings, -see note 114, infra.
'Dixon, J., p. 784: "It may be regarded as settled, by a long train of adjudicatiohs, culminating in
Atherton v. Atherton [supra note so], that the state, wherein are the matrimonial domicil and also
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Jersey courts proceed upon the theory that the injunction may issue against one
domiciled therein, though temporarily absent, provided he is properly served, ac-
cording to the laws of New Jersey, either constructively, or personally outside the
state, if he have actual notice of the injunction.89 In view of the extraordinary
nature of this relief, it is submitted that the New York view is more preferable.
Suppose that one spouse has already begun a suit for divorce in another jurisdic-
tion, will a court of the domicil of the other spouse issue an injunction to restrain a
further prosecution thereof? In the early New York case of Mead v. Merritt,90
Chancellor Walworth intimated that after a suit had once been commenced in a
foreign court, no injunction would issue to restrain further proceedings because such
would be inconsistent with interstate comity.9 ' In a later case,92 Chancellor Wal-
worth said: "It must be a very special case which will induce it to break over the
rule of comity, and of policy, which forbids the granting of an injunction to stay
the proceedings in a suit, which has already been commenced, in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction in a sister state." The distinction drawn by Chancellor Walworth
has not been followed by the great majority of courts in this country.93 In Forrest v.
Forrest94 the wife sued for a divorce on the ground of adultery and also for an
injunction restraining her husband from proceeding with the prosecution of a
divorce suit begun in Pennsylvania. The injunction was granted, Edmonds, J., dis-
the domicil of complaining spouse, has the right to confer upon its court jurisdiction over the matrimonial
status, no matter where the other spouse may be. In such circumstances the matrimonial status is
deemed to have a situs within the state resembling, for the time being, the situs of land, and the
proceeding respecting that status in quasi in rem. This power is recognized and upheld by foreign states,
provided the state exercising it has made and carried out reasonable provision for giving to the defendant
notice and an opportunity to be heard ....
For the purpose of pronouncing a decree in the cause there must be appearance by the defendant, or
process served upon him within the state,.or publication of notice to him.. . . But, for the purpose of
giving effect to a preliminary injunction, nothing more is needed than that the defendant should have
received due notice of the injunction.
"In the case now before us, the matrimonial domicil and the domicil of the complainant being
actually within the state when the bill was filed, the court had the right to proceed to final decree against
the defendant, even though he remained absent from the state, and therefore to require his obedience
to the injunction, of which he had notice"
We are again confronted with the rather misleading character of the "in rem" language. Note
further that in divorce actions, alimony can be granted only on in personam.jurisdiction. Is the question
not really the same here?
"See REssAmTr-aNT, CoNFLICr OF LA'*s, 547.
" 2 Paige 402 (N. Y. 1831). The injunction sought to restrain defendants from applying to the
Court of Probates in Connecticut.
In Busby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297 (1821), an injunction was issued although a suit was already
pending in Scotland upon a bond.
'However, Chancellor Walworth said: "Independent of this question of jurisdiction, it is evident
that the complainant has no right to the equitable interposition of this court." 2 Paige 402, 406
(N. Y. 1831).
"Burgess v. Smith, 2 Barb. Ch. 276, 280 (N. Y. x847).
"Cole v. Cunningham, supra note a; Dehon v. Foster, 1upra.note 28.
Supra note- 5r.
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approving Mead v. Merritt in regard to the distinction above noted.95  In the larg,
majority of cases where the courts have considered the granting of an injunction t
restrain divorce proceedings elsewhere, the divorce suit has actually been corn
menced.96 That is, if the equity plaintiff is otherwise entitled, the injunction re
straining the divorce proceedings will not be denied because the foreign proceeding
have already been commenced. Because of the very nature of the divorce proceeding.,
less weight should be given to the fact that the suit has been initiated abroad thai
in other cases where the equity defendant has a definite choice of forum. 7
The fact that the divorce sought to be enjoined would be void and of no effc
in the enjoining state will not prevent the issuance of the injunction. 8 There ha
'At p. x85: "But, if the distinction is well taken, it cannot be made to apply to a cae where th
foreign tribunal is not competent to grant full and adequate relief."
The defendant husband claimed that he had changed his residence to Pennsylvania and was therefor
entitled to bring divorce proceedings there. "But if he did so change his residence, and that for th
purpose of giving the courts of that state jurisdiction of his case, nothing is better settled in our court
than that such temporary residence, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, is in fraudum leghi
and will be disregarded...." At p. 184.
"It is manifest.., that the defendant cannot obtain, in his suit in Pennsylvana, a decree whid
can be binding on his wife here." At p. z86.
A new idea is here introduced, namely, the ineffectiveness of the contemplated Pennsylvania decre
'New York cases: Forrest v. Forrest, supra note s1 (in Pennsylvania); Kittle v. Kittle, upra note 5:
(in Connecticut); Gwathmey v. Gwathrney, rupra note 51 (in Florida); Greenberg v. Greenberg, sapr,
note 48 (in Moreles, Mexico); May v. May supra note x (in Nevada; injunction denied because s-rvio
out of state); Richman v. Richnan, supra note z (in Mexico); Dublin v. Dublin, supra note z (in Pennyl
vania).
New Jersey cases: Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra note 50 (in North Dakota); Huettinger v. Huettinge
srspra note 5o (in South Dakota); Kempson v. Kempson, spra note 50 (in North Dakota); Miller v
Miller, =upra note 5o (in South Dakota); von Bernuth v. von Bernuth, spra note go (in New Yorkl)
Perlman v. Perlman, supra note i (in Nevada); Knapp v. Knapp, supra note x (in Mexico); Di Brigidia V
Di Brigidia, supra note x (in Nevada).
Particularly is this true in New York where the courts do not recognize a foreign ex party divoro
against a citizen of Nep York. Haddock v. Haddock, supra note xx; People v. Baker, supra note ao
Fischer v. Fischer, supra !note 48; Lefferu v. Lefferts, supra note 48.
New Jersey will recognize ;n ex parle divorce by a state in which the plaintiff was domiciled, i
such decree might have been obtained in New Jersey on the same ground, and there has been sucl
service on the defendant as gives him notice and a reasonable opportunity to apper. Schneider v
Schneider, 1o3 N. J. Eq. 149, 142 Atl. 417 (1928); Ballantine v. Ballantine, rxa N. J. Eq. aaa, 164 Ad.!
(1933).
In Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 48, the husband brought an action for divorce in Nec
York. Before the determination of these proceedings, and while both parties were residents of Nev
York, he began a similar action in Mexico, upon grounds not recognized in New York, and under con
ditions such that the decree would be void in New York. The wife brought this action to enjoin furthe
prosecution of the divorce action in Mexico. Held, an injunction should be granted.
Dowiing, J., pp. xs, xx6: "Nor is it an answer to this application for relief to say that the deere
of divorce sought to be obtained in Mexico will be invalid in this State and, therefore, plaintiff need
no injunction to prevent its issuance. The defendant cannot be presumed to have gone to the expea
and trouble of placing himself under the jurisdiction of the courts of Mexico as a mere gesture 0
protest or spite. He is endeavoring not merely in that forum to obtain a decree of divorce but ti
question the legitimate birth of his child and to settle the amount he is to pay for the maintenance o
wife and child here. He says he is now advised by his counsel (presumably his New York cotns4el
that a decree obtained in Mexico under the circumstances present in his case there, is absolutely nul
and yoid so far as this plaintiff is concerned. Why then does he object to his useless action belnj
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been some authority"9 to the effect that while an injunction would be proper when
the foreign divorce decree would be valid in the jurisdiction rendering it, "the
propriety of an injunction is not so clear when the divorce decree of the foreign
jurisdiction would be wholly invalid, since it is usually said that a court of equity
will not intervene to restrain a proceeding wholly void, just as it will not entertain
an action to remove a cloud on title when the instrument giving rise to the cloud is
void on its face." It is submitted that this position is untenable.' 0 0 It would seem
that the ex parte divorce is valid at least in the state of the forum. Nor does the fact
that the equity plaintiff will suffer no financial loss prevent the issuance of the in-
junction.10 1 True, after the foreign divorce, the plaintiff wife could sue for separate
maintenance.' 0 2 Plaintiff wife can still get dower or the statutory substitute in some
states.'
08
enjoined and why does he fail to abandon it, but on the contrary resist any attempt to halt its progress?
If he were allowed to prosecute his Mexican action to judgment, undoubtedly be would then find
Mexican counsel to advise him that his divorce obtained there was valid in Mexico, and that he was
free to contract a second marriage in that country. Thus plaintiff would be in danger of having her
status assailed and her rights invaded by having a husband with one wife in New York and another
in Mexico....
"A wife who has given no ground for divorce in this State where she and her husband have always
lived during their married life, should not be exposed to the humiliation and doubt as to her statS
raised by a judgment of divorce in another State, even if fraudulently obtained and invalid here.
"There are many conceivable uses to which such a judgment of divorce could be put, causing plaintiff
expense, litigation, worry, annoyance and misrepresentation. It is no answer to say that she must
ultimately succeed against any attack made upon her, under the judgment, as it is invalid."
To the same effect, Johnson v. Johnson, supra note x; Richman v. Richman, supra note x; Gwathney V.
Gwathmey, supra note 5%; Forrest v. Forrest, supra note 5x.
"See (19a6) xx MiN. L. Rav. 467, 468.
"Ibid: "In dealing with what might perhaps be called a 'cloud on the marriage status:' the court
[in Greenberg v. Greenberg] allows the practical objections to such a 'cloud' to prevail over the logical
proposition that anything entirely void cannot be a cloud."
... Johnson v. Johnson, supra note I at 95, Hefferman, J.: "Counsel for defendant contend that the
court is powerless to protect plaintiff by injunction against defendant's threatened wrong, on the theory
that she is not damaged financially. That argument is readily refuted. Defendant is attempting to
annul plaintiff's status as his wife and thereby invade her personal rights. There are other things
in life besides mere money damages. Not every element of wrong can be estimated and ascertained in
dollars and cents. Because the pecuniary injuries which plaintiff may sustain, if defendant should accom-
plish his purpose, cannot be measured with mathematical accuracy, is no reason for holding that she is
outside the pale of the court's protection."
'u Garabrant v. Garabrant, 95 N. 1. Eq. 136, 122 Ad. 848 (1923) (Oklahoma divorce); Sechler Y.
Sechler, 94 N. J. Eq. 47, zx8 Af. 629 (1922) (Nevada divorce); Robins v. Robins, xo3 N. J. Eq. 26, x42
At. x68 (X928) (Mexican divorce); Reik v. Reik, o9 N. J. Eq. 6x5, 158 Ad. 5i9 (x932) (Mexican
divorce), afl'd 12 N. J. Eq. 234, 163 Ad. 907 (1933); Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, supra note 1 (Nevada
divorce).
' Ie New York Decedent Estate Law, N. Y. CoNs. lAws (Cahill, 3930) C. 13, S87, provides:
"No distributive share of the estate of a decedent shall be allowed under the provisions of this article,
either (a) to a spouse against whom or in whose favor a final decree or judgment of divorce recognized
as valid by the law of this state has been rendered; (b) or to a spouSO who has procured without th-
state of New York a final decree or judgment dissolving the marriage with the decedent, where such
decree or judgment it not recognized as valid by the law of this late." (Italics author's.)
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C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INJUNCTION RESTRAINING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
OUTSIDE THE DOMICIL
x. Legal Consequences.
What is the efficacy of the injunction' 04 of State X, effectively issued, restraining
divorce proceedings elsewhere? It has been suggested that the issuance of such an
injunction against the usual foreign suit is, in effect, a judicial determination that
no court but that of State X is an appropriate tribunal to hear the particular cause,
"something in the nature of a negative doctrine of forum non conveniens."10orI The
injunction would seem to be based on a judicial determination that the equity de-
fendant had not the necessary domiciliary requirements to maintain an out-of-state
divorce suit,106 at least at the time of the injunction hearing; and that he had no
statutory grounds on which to proceed to a divorce. 10 7 Whether the injunction be
temporary or permanent in character, the hearing would seem to decide no more
than this. The injunction in Johnson v. Johnson 08 was an in pcrsonam restraint
upon the husband, in his capacity as a citizen of New York, enjoining him, pending
the hearing on his wife's suit for separation, from fraudulently evading the laws of
New York and proceeding to a divorce elsewhere. That is, that at the time of the
injunction, there was no other court where he could so proceed. The injunction,
however, could not prevent a change of domicil, and were he in good faith to effect
such a change of domicil and citizenship, the basis of the injunction would seem to
be destroyed.10 He would then be in a position to institute a valid foreign divorce
action. 110
What is the likelihood of the equity defendant proceeding with the foreign
divorce in disregard of the injunction? The chances are that the injunction will
be an effective restraint.111 In the six cases, cited in the footnote,112 despite the
injunction, the equity defendant has proceeded to obtain an ex parte divorce. In
only two of these cases was th; equity defendant before the court of the restraining
'The authority to pronounce such a decree carries with it, of course, the power to punish disobedience
thereof through contempt proceedings. See note 114, infra.
'Note (1933) 31 MiciL I. Rzv. 963, 966.
Domicil, however, is a jurisdictional fact, supra note 21.
SThat is, in the enjoining state.
'Supra, note 45.
'" Note (x933) 28 ILL. I- Rav. 295, 296: "Presumably, however, the defendant is not forever bound
by this expressed intent (to prosecute a foreign divorce without a change of New York domicil) and
could change it to one consistent with the establishment of an actual foreign domicil which would
destroy the New York citizenship of the defendant which forms the basis of his personal restraint."
' But would such a divorce be recognized in New York if the divorce defendant, continuing her
New York residence, were not personally served within the divorce state and did not appear in the suit?
Probably not. See note 48, supra. In regard to the recognition of such a decree in New Jersey, see note
97, supra. See also 2 N. J. CoMP. STAr. (1910) p. 2041, S33-
. Even though the equity defendant obtains his divorce, he must forever remain out of the enjoining
state through fear of contempt proceedings. Furthermore, his property there would be subject to
sequestration. For the average property owner these would seem to be sufficient deterrents.
' Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 5o; Perlman v. Perlman, supra note i; Di Brigidia V. Di Brigidia,
supra note s; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra note 5o; Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, upra note 5x; Borda v.
Borda, supra note 52.
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state for contempt.1 13 In each case there was punishment therefor.1 14 Should the
restraining divorce plaintiff proceed to a decree and not return to the enjoining state,
presumably he could not be punished. The rule to show cause must be served in
person. His local property, however, might be sequestered.
A distinction must be noticed between the cases: first, where the equity defendant,
at the time of the restraining order, has already commenced the foreign divorce pro-
ceedings, and second, where no such steps have as yet been taken.P 5 In the latter
case, compliance with the injunction is simple. In the former situation the equity
defendant must consider whether he has the power to dismiss the foreign divorce
suit."1 8 Recalling that in our typical set-up the divorce defendant does not desire a
decree, it would seem that the court should allow a non-suit. A very different prob-
lem would be presented if the divorce defendant appeared and objected to the
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiff therein. 1 1
So far we have considered the injunction from the standpoint of the equity de-
fendant. and of the enjoining state. What about the exterritorial effect of such
restraining order ?111 Is it entitled to protection under .the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution?'1 9  Will there be a discretionary recognition of the
equity decree? Or will it be disregarded entirely with the result that the divorce suit
'Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 50; Perlman v. Perlman, supra note z; see, however, Borda v.
Borda, supra note 52.
"' Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 50. After the defendant's divorce, marriage, and return to New
Jersey, he was brought before the court for contempt. Pitney, V. C., at p. 329: "The defendant [must]
take proper measures to undo the result of the contemptuous act, and put the complainant in her former
condition. . .. I will advise a decree fining the defendant . . . . and that he be committed to
custody . . . until the fine and costs are paid, and until he shall take proper aftd efficient methods to
open and set aside the decree which he has obtained in the Dakota court against the complainant."
In Kempson v. Kempson, 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 At. 360, 625 (go2), this attachment decree was
modified. Dixon, J., at P. 787: "We think that decree [of divorce] should be set aside, but evidently
the defendant has not the power to ensure this result; only the court that rendered the decree .can
vacate it.... We therefore think that this part of the order should be modified so as to require the
defendant to present the truth to the court in North Dakota and in good- faith to urge that its decree be
set aside. When that is shown to have been clone and the fine and costs have been paid, the defendant
should be released."
A similar order was made in Perlman v. Perlman, supra note r.
It is interesting to notice that in both these cases the injunction order was not served within New
Jersey.
I See note 96, Supra
"'In regard to the injunction against foreign suits in general, it is said, (1932) 3 Msc. L. REv. 88,
92-93: "When he obeys the decree and dismisses his action abroad, he is exercising the power available
to any plaintiff. That he may'do so without prejudice up to the time of the trial is generally held. After
that point it is within the discretion of the court to determine whether a non-suit may be entered without
Lejudie.
IU, See Borda v. Borda, upra note 75.
'"Ir discussing this in general, (1930) 39 YAtz L. J. 719, 720: "But to a defendant, seeking relief
from a vexatious foreign suit, the issuance of the injunction and the threat of negative 'enforcement'
are of no more than contributory importance. His ultimate concern is with the positive prohibitive ef-
fectiveness of the injunction in preventing the foreign suit. This effectiveness is dependent upon the
active recognition which will be accorded the injunction by the courts of the sister state iwhen the
plaintiff disobeys the decree and attempts to sue."
I"See note 19, supra.
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will proceed on its merits? 20 If the foreign divorce court were likely to dismiss
the suit on the ground that it is not the appropriate forum, the need for the issuance
of the injunction would cease. The injunction is issued on the apparent assumption
that the foreign court will take jurisdiction. And such has been the clear practice
of the divorce "shops."
These are highly controversial matters, even when dealing with an ordinary
injunction restraining a suit on a transitory cause of action. Unfortunately the
comparatively few decided cases upon this point deal with types of litigation which
can generally be maintained by non-residents.121  On the other hand, a suit for
divorce can be maintained only at the domicil of at least one of the parties. 122
Again, in the decided cases dealing with .he exterritorial recognition of the injunc-
tion in general, there has been an appearance by the equity plaintiff in the foreign
court and the injunction has been offered as a reason for refusing to take jurisdiction
over the cause. In the divorce set-up (and there arc no reported cases dealing with
exterritorial recognition of this type of restraining order) the divorce court most
likely will not have notice of the injunction. The equity defendant 12 3 will not make
disclosure thereof; the equity plaintiff is not likely to appear to contest the jurisdic-
tion of the court and to give notice of the injunction. This not only because of the
expense and inconvenience, but also because of the danger of submitting to the
jurisdiction of the divorce court1 2 4 Furthermore, it is common knowledge that the
divorce "markets" of today are all too willing to assume divorce jurisdiction for
various reasons, and require nothing more than residence of the plaintiff in the state
for the statutory period.125
First, does the full faith and credit clause require recognition of the injunction?
If not, should there be discretionary recognition? The Supreme Court has not yet
spoken on the first pomt.; 8 The question is rarely alluded to in the state courts.
__Much has been written on the exterritorial effect of injunction against suit: Mesner, supra note 22;
(930) 39 YALE L- J. 719; (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REV. 963; (1924) 22 MIcH. L REV. 469; (1923) 33 YALz
L J. 95; (1924) 72 U. oF PA. L REv. 429; (1923) 37 HAxv. L REv. 157; Note (199) i A. L R. 148.
'State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589 (1918); Union Pacific R. I. v.
Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. x6x (1923); Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72
So. 846 (19x6); Allen v. Chicago, Great Western R. R., 239 Ill. App. 38 (1925), are some of the
leading eases.
'See note 35. =prL -
'For a typical set-up, see Di Brigidia v. Di Brigidia, supra note 67.
'As to the effect of appearance, see RESTrA1EMENr, CONFLcr OF LAws S451; also note 63, supra.
For helpful material on this important question which cannot be here discussed, see Medina, Conclusive-
nest of Rulings on jurisdiction (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 238; Gavit, jurisdiction of the Subject Matter
and Res ludicata (1932) 8o U. oF PA. L REv. 386; Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of Adjudications of
Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 552; Notes (1931) 4z HAxv. L. REV. 055; (1931) 26
ILi. L REv. 432.
'See Note (1933) 17 MINN. L REv. 638; also Squire v.'Squire, supra note x5, where an Arkansas
court granted the plaintiff wife a divorce although she admitted that she had no intention oj making
Arkansas her home, oa the ground that "the statute relative to jurisdiction (ninety days residence) had
been literally complied with." Recall the recent "Barbara Hutton" divorce in Reno.
'All-inclusive dicta, however, are common. See Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 451 (1928).
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In spite of arguments advanced in favor of full faith and credit recognition,121 the
only authority is a dissenting opinion in the case of Union Pcific R. 1. v. Rule.'2 8
It has been said that "if the equity decree were entitled to full faith and credit, the
injunction would be in everything but form an order restraining the foreign court
itself. Acdordingry there is almost no substantial authority for compulsory recogni-
tion of the decree in the foreign law court."12 9 The Committee on Jurisprudence
and.Law Reform of the American Bar Association introduced into Congress a bill
which would extend the full faith and credit clause to all equitable decrees.t3 0 There
is, however, a little authorit' for discretionary recognition,' 8 ' but a majority of the
rulings on the point have allowed the equity defendant to sue.'
2
We have been discussing the recognition of the injunction against suit in general.
How about the divorce set-up? Are there any distinguishing features here which
might dictate a definite answer? It is necessary to recall upon what the enjoining
state has passed, primarily, that the equity defendant has not the domicil, at the time
of the injunction, to sue for divorce elsewhere, and this is a jurisdictional fact; sec-
ondarily, that no cause for divorce exists within the enjoining state. If full faith and
credit is to be given to this determination, it must be on the basis of res jidicaa.' "
But what has been decided? First, a question of domicil, a jurisdictional fact, and
second that no ground for divorce exists in the restraining state, which finding would
not seem to be conclusive as to grounds which might exist in the divorce forum.
There would seem, therefore, to have been no real finding of fact upon which could
be based the plea of res judicata. When the equity defendant appears in the foreign
divorce court, Nevada,-for instance, assuming the court learns of the injunction, what
effect should be given thereto? Nevada could then make a further finding of
domicil (it being a jurisdictional fact) and determine for itself that the divorce
plaintiff was there domiciled. This would not necessarily go counter to the determina-
tion of the enjoining state; recognition could be given to the finding of domicil
there up to the time of the injunction, after which there had been a change3'4 Again
because of the jurisdictional character of domicil, the Nevada finding might well not
find favor with the courts of New York or New Jersey. The courts of the enjoining
state would undoubtedly punish for contempt upon a return thereto. But the theory
thus advanced would be sufficient to entitle the Nevada court to ignore the restraint.
The injunction merely determined domicil up to the issuance thereof. It could then
UlGooniuct, CoNsucr oF LAws (1927) 483; (1923) 33 YAL L ..95. 96; (1930) 39 YAIX L 1.
7T.O (n_, l, M,. L. REv .- !%K7 . Contra: (1923) 37 H-Iv. L. REv. 157, x58; (1924) 71 U. or
PA. L. Rrv. 42S9 432.
= Supra, note 122.
2' Foster, supra note 34, (1930) 43 H~xv. L REv. 1217. 1245.
'"See (1927) 52 A. B. A. REP. 292; also (1930) 39 YALE I. J. 719, 725, n. 3t.
'"Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., Mpra note 321; Allen v. Chicago, Great Western R. R, pra
note 121.
1 (193o) 39.YALz L 1. 719, 721.
For an excellent treatment of these problems, see RtsrATEuoEmT ComWa-r oF I. s, 55449, 450.U4An interesting analogy is to be found in the recognition given to a decree of custody by another nam
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proceed to find that a cause for divorce exists under its law, while accepting the
finding of no such cause under the law of the enjoining state.1 3 . Thcrefore, it is
submitted, that if the case ever arises, the div.rce court will not feel fettered by the
full faith and credit clause, nor will it be likely to give discretionary recognition to
the restraining order. And this even though there had been a contest on the merits
over the issuance of the injunction. A more complicated case would be where the
divorce suit had already been started at the time of the injunction. 136 Domicil is
supposed to be present at the commencement of the suit.
2. Social Consequences
The conjecture has been made137 that the injunction against divorce will be
likely, from a practical standpoint, to prove an effective deterrent. This is based
upon the assumption that the equity defendant contemplates a continued residence
in the forum of the injunction. Otherwise, a legally simple but perhaps practically
inconvenient method of avoiding the efficacy of the equitable decree presents itself.188
What about the desirability from a social standpoint, however, of this attempt to
control migratory divorce? Its social utility has not necessarily been dictated by the
observations already made. To attempt to answer this question we must consider
for a moment broad divorce policy. In spite of our theory of divorce, based as it is
upon old English ecclesiastical practice, that a decree can be granted only to an "in-
nocent" spouse against a "guilty" one, 39 .that where there has been proved collusion,
connivance, recrimination, or condonation a decree will not issue, divorce practice
differs materially. Between the "law in the books" and the "law in action" there is
little correlation. Parties, if they desire a divorce, or even if one wishes to break the
marriage tie, will, in spite of the theoretical law, obtain a decree. This is, of course,
based on the assumption that the parties can bear the necessary financial outlay.
Otherwise, "desertion," the "poor man's divorce," is likely to result.1 40 In Dther
words, the law exercises little deterrent force in divorce.
In all the cases, where an injunction has issued against foreign divorce, there has
been an actual family break-up. Little chance appears of affecting a permanent
reconciliation on a going basis. And one can hardly imagine that the injunction
would enhance this possibility. If anything, it is likely still further to widen the
breach. This brings us face to face with the question of whether the interests of
society are served by struggling to keep intact what amounts tcs an empty marriage.
Unfortunately, we have no factual studies based on the social desirability of divorce.
tut it is submitted that society is not served by a preservation of the empty legal
The equity defendant will be likely to choose a divorce forum .where the causes for divorce differ
from those in the enjoining state. See Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 5o; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra
note 50.,
" See p. 383, £Up=L
Note I, supra.
' A change.of domicil to the divorce forum.
'There are a few "comparative rectitude' statutes. E.g., Nev. Sess. Laws 1931, c. 110,J 30.
" See Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (1932) 32 COL. L. Rsv. 1aS1, 1303, n. 55-
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status of matrimony. Even decrees of legal separation have at times been frowned
upon.141
Accepting then these premises, it would seem that the injunction against divorce
should not be favored. It may well have given in many instances an enlarged
bargaining power to the equity plaintiff. We have seen that in spite of the void
ex parte decree, financial protection is generally secured to the divorce defendant ."
Only where such security is threatened by the foreign suit and the remarriage which
is likely to follow, should the injunction issue. This was actually the situation in
Richman v. Richman.'"
Ill. THE Dwt.utgAroRy JUDGMENT
What is the efficacy of the declaratory judgment 44 in regard to a foreign ex parte
divorce? Recall our typical set-up. One spouse has left the matrimonial domicil in
State X against the wishes of the other, has obtained a divorce in State Y, the other
spouse neither appearing nor being served with process within the jurisdiction of the
divorce forum. A second marriage by the divorce plaintiff is likely to follow. What
is the divorce defendant to do? He or she may not care to proceed with his available
remedies, namely, divorce, annulment of the second marriage, and, if the wife, a
suit for support and maintenance." 5 What is desired is an authoritative declaration
that the foreign ex parte divorce is void and of no effect. In other words, a judg-
ment is sought declaring the preservation and continuance of the marital rights. to
what extent can this be obtained through the medium of the declaratory judgment
procedure?' 48
See 2 VExmNER, Aut .xcAN FAmmy Laws (1932) 341.
Note oa2, supra.
'Supra note z. Alimony awarded the wife, pending her suit for separation, was in arrears. The
husband begAn divorce proceedings in Mexico. An injunction was granted to restrain the divorce pio.
ceedings and any attempt by the defendant to marry anyone else. This was based largely on economic
grounds.
For a comprehensive treatment of declaratory judgments, see the monumental treatise by Borchard.
Dc aLATOILY Ju omzdNe' (1934). Because of the careful treatment there given to every phase of
declaratory judgment procedure, the background discussion here will be brief. See also Borchard, The
Declaratory Iudgmcni-A Needed Procedural Relorm (1918) 28 YAI.E L. J. 1, 105; Sunderland, A Mod-
ern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory ludgmenz (1917) 16 Mtsc. L. Rxv. 69.
BoR suA., op. cit., supra, at 629: "The declaratory judgment differs in no essential respect from
any other judgment except that it is not followed by a decree for damages, injunction, specific perform.
ance, or other immediately coercive relief. It declares conclusively and finally the rights of parties in
litigations over a contested issue, a form of relief which often suffices to settle controversies and fully
administer justice. It enables parties in disputes over their nghts. . . to sue for. a declaration of
rights ... citing as defendants those who oppose their claims of right. It has been employed in State
courts ... for the determination of status in marital or domestic relations....
I" Note zo2 supraL
3"For a history of the declaratory judgment and English practice, see Boitcn .n, op. cit., supra
note 144, c. VI; also Borchard, supra note 144; Sunderland, supra note 144. For half a century the
practice has been common in England,
In 1922 The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 9 U. L. A. 1a. Up to July 1, z934, this act had been adopted
by nineteen states. Thirteen other states have a declaratory judgment statute. BoRctAIaM, op. Cit., $upra,
632. For the New York statute see Civ. PaC. Acr (Cahill, xg5) 5473; Rules of Civil Practice ao-24.
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"The determination of questions of status was the earliest function of the declar-
atory judgment both in Roman law and by specific designation in the English law.
The public and private interest in the security and certainty of personal status in-
duced the earliest etension of judicial power to the determination of doubtful or
disputed cases of status" 147 If the question of status can be determined judicially,
it is not necessary to assert or determine the rights consequent thereon; they are
merely incidents of the status itself. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that
when the divorce defendant, in our typical case, wishes to assert the continued
validity of the marriage and at the same time the invalidity of the second marital
venture of his spouse, resort should be had to the declaratory judgment. Such was
the picture in the leading case of Baumann v. Baumann.14 The wife sued for a
declaratory judgment pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Act, 5473.149 The
plaintiff A and the defendant B, who have always been domiciled in New York, had
been married there in 19o9, and two children had been born. In 1924 a separation
agreement was entered into under which A released her dower rights and was to
receive $21,ooo a year. In 1924 B left the matrimonial domicil in New York and
procured an ex parte decree of divorce in Mexico from a court without jurisdiction
of the cause, A neither appearing in the action nor being served with process. B then
purported to marry the defendant C in Corinecticut, and returned to New York to
live with her as husband and wife. The plaintiff asked, first, for a declaratory
judgment to the effect that (x) the plaintiff is the lawful wife of B- (2) the de-
fendants B and C are not husband and wife; and (3) the colorable decree of Mexican
divorce is invalid and of no effect; and, second, an injunction enjoining and restrain-
ing the defendants from living together as husband and wife and enjoining the
defendants, or either of them, from representing or holding themselves out as hus-
band and wife, and enjoining the defendant C from using the name of Mrs. B. The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency. This motion was
'"Borchard. spra note 144, 28 YA. L J. 05, 123. For example, the Legitimacy Declaration Act(z858), 21 and 22 VIcr. C. 93, Si; now supplanted by the Legitimacy Act (1926), 16 and z7, Gao. V.C. 6o, S2. Also the suit in the English ecclesiastical courts, known as "jactitation of marriage," now prac-tically obsolete. Either party to an alleged marriage could allege that he had never entered into such
marriage, and, if successful, received a declaration that the marriage had never existed and an injunc-tion restraining the other party f-orn asserting, the marriage. Such suit could not be maintained by a
third party.
i 25o N. Y. 382, 65 N. E. 829 (1929), modifying 224 App. Div. 719, 229 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1928).
agf'g 132 Misc. 217, 228 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1928). Reargument denied, 25o N. Y. 6a2, z66 N. E. 344
(1929).
" "The supreme court shall have the power in any action or proceeding to declare rights and otherlegal relations on request for such declaration whether or not further relief is o could be claimed, and
such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. Such provisions shall be made by rules as maybe necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this section."
Ruli of Civil Practice 210: "An action in the supreme court to obtain a declaratory judgment, pur-
suant to section 473 of the Civil Practice Act, in matters of procedure shall follow the forms and prac-
tice prescribed in the Civil Practice Act and rules for other actions in that court."
Rule 2x2: "If, in the opinion of the court, the parties shall be left to relief by existing forms Of
actions, or for other reasons, it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the grounds
on which its discretion is so exercised."
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granted by the trial court without hearing the plaintiff's evidence, on the ground
that A had a remedy by action to annul the second marriage.' °0  Held, on appeal,' 51
however, that upon the facts stated in the complaint the plaintiff was entitled to
some relief, and the'order dismissing the comphnint for insufficiency was reversed.
Whereupon, at the trial of the case, 152 judgment was granted for A adjudging and
declaring the purported Mexican divorce and the Connecticut marriage to be null
and void, and that A vas entitled to injunctive relief. This was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Division. 153 In the Court of Appeals the judgment was
modified by striking out the -restraining clauses, 15 4 and, as so modified, was affirmed.
"The plaintiff has secured a declaratory judgment which adjudges that she is the
lawful wife of the defendant Charles Ludwig Bauman; that the defendants are not
and never have been husband and wife; that an alleged divorce procured by the de-
fendant Charles Ludwig Bauman from the plaintiff in Yucatan, Mexico, is null and
void; and that an alleged marriage between the defendants.., is null and void.
The findings and evidence justify the judgment to that extent."155
'N. Y. Cv. PxAc. Ac-r. (Cahill, 1925) $7134: "An action to annul a marriage upon the ground
that the former husband or wife of one of the parties was living, may be maintained by either party
during the lifetime of the other, or by the former husband or wife."
M 222 App. Div. 46o, 226 N. Y. Supp. 576 (x928). Merrell, J., at p. 463: "In granting the motion of
the defendants the court below seized upon the provisions of rule 252 and assumed to exercise discretion
and held that the plaintiff had a remedy in this state which would accomplish all that she seeks to
accomplish in her present action, namely, that the plaintiff might bring an action to annul the mar-
riage.... There may be some question as to ithe right of the courts of this state to adjudicate as to the
validity of the Mexican decree of divorce, . .. and as to the right of the plaintiff to annul the mar- -
riage purported to have been entered into between the defendants. ... Nevertheless, we are of the
opinion that the plaintiff has substantial personal and property rights which demand an adjudication
as to her status in his state as the wife of the defendant Baumann.... We think that the action for
declaratory judgment for the relief sought by plaintiff is permissible. ... Whatever relief the plainti"
may receive by the judgment in this action must be left to the trial. Suffce it to say that in out
opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some relief herein, and that she is entitled to have declared her matri-
monial status here with the defendant Baumann. Not only is this a matter of personal concern to the
plaintiff, but it may well be that her property rights may be involved as well as those of the children
of the parties."
m 32 Misc. 217, 28 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1928)-
F 2 2 4 App. Div. 719, 229 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1928).
It is beyond our scope to consider the interesting problems raised by -the application for injunctive
relief. The Baumann case was folowed on this point by Somberg v. Somberg, supra note a; and Lowe v.
Lowe, supra note a. See Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (19%5)
29 HA3xv. L Rxv. 640; Long, Equitable Iuuirdktion to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 YAtZ L. I.
1s1; Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations (193o) S8 I y. I. J. 207; (929) 17 CALM.
L Rkv. 681; (1929) 29 Co1.. L. REv. 213- (1930) 43 HAV. L. R.V. 477; (1930) 28 Mxcii. L. RZr.
342; (1929) 78 U. op PA. L Rav. 14, (1934) 8a U. op PA. L. Ra. 542. Accord in regard to the de-
nial of injunctive relief, Snedaker v. King, xx Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 11 (1924).
"i 250 N. Y. at 384, Hubbs, J. In Morecroft v. Taylor, 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. Supp. a (1929),
where the plaintiff was held entitled to maintain an action for a declaratory judgment that she was the
illegitimate daughter of the defendant, O*Malley, J., said, at p. 564: "In- Baumann v. Baumann the plaintifi-
... had various existent remedies open to her for the same specific judgment. She could have sird for
separation. She had an action for divorce. She was in a position to have sued in criminal conversation.
Yet, with all these other available remedies, she was given the right to bring an action for a mere
declaratory judgment."
In Lowe v. Lowe, supra note a, following Baumann v. Baumann, the plajntiff wife obtained a declam-
tory judgment to the effect that a Nevada divorce obtained by her husband was void. Iba J.,
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In Somberg v. Somberg.5. the plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment that
she was the lawful wife of the defendant Somberg. In this case the husband S, with-
out even bothering to obtain a void foreign divorce, began living with the defendant
B as husband and wife. A child C was born. It was generally believed and
rumored, in the circle to which the parties belonged, that S had divorced the plaintiff
and married B. The declaratory judgment -was denied 1 57 because the plaintiff's
status as the wife of the defendant was secured; because such a declaration is proper
only when the circumstances render it useful and necessary to stabilize uncertain and
disputed legal relations. The denial of the relief here has been criticized by
Borchard. 5s
In Henry v. Henry5" the husband sought a decree adjudging a Nevada divorce
void in New Jersey. The defendant moved to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdic-
tion. The wife had wrongfully deserted the plaintiff in New Jersey, the matrimonial
domicil, and proceeded to Nevada to secure a divorce for a cause which occurred
while the parties lived in New Jersey and which was not recognized by the law of
the latter state. It was further alleged that the defendant did not acquire a bona fide
domicil in Nevada. The court found that the divorce was void under New Jersey
law. 06° Learning, V. C. said:1" 1 "The sole ground of the present motion is the
claim that this court may not determine the validity of a decree of divorce of a sister
state except as an incident to other relief, such as a suit for maintenance or divorce in
which the decree of divorce of a sister state is interposed as a bar to the primary
relief sought.... But it may be here appropriately suggested that it is unnecessary
to regard the present bill as invoking the statutory divorce jurisdiction of this court.
It may be said to be an appeal to the original equity jurisdiction of this court for
the protection of complainant against the consequences of defendant's fraud.... It
will be noticed that no other remedy is open to complainant in this state, sincq he
desires neither alimony nor divorce. Complainant also urges that the bill may be
sustained under our act concerning declaratory judgments and decrees." The motion
to strike out the bill was denied.
In Schneider v. Schneider8 2 the plaintiff wife married the defendant in New
York -in 1918. On July z5, 1927, a Paris court of competent jurisdiction, made a
stated, p. 201: "Because it (the Nevada divorce) gave color of right to an open claim that the plaintiff
was no longer the lawful wife of Lowe, it furnishes a ground for the invocation of the courts power
to declare the plaintiff's rights to the legal relation of the parties, in order to preclude possible contro-
versy hereafter."
Supra note 2.
Kellogg, J., at p. 4: "A declaratory judgment may be resorted to only when circumstances render
it 'useful and necessary'; where it will 'serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain
or disputed jural relation either as to present or prospective obligations. Where there is no necessity
for resorting to the declaratory judgment, it should not be employed.' The plaintiff's status, as the wife
of Somberg, is secure. If rumor casts doubts upon it, no declaration by the court that it is false will
be useu to surpress it."
Bocsu-..m, op. ct.,, supra note 144, at 393.
"Supra note a. ' N.J. CoP. S-"A'. (1g0) p. 2041, 533.
'At p. a. ISupa note 2.
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decree divorcing the plaintiff and the defendant. The action, on the ground of
desertion, was begun by the husband as a claimed resident of Paris, and the wife
appeared and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of that court, but put in no defense.
The defendant returned to the United States in August, x927, and in the same month
married again in Maryland, and now resides in New York with his second wife.
On September 15, 1927, the plaintiff appealed from the French divorce, contending
that the court was without jurisdiction and the evidence insufficient. She was over-
ruled on the former point and ordered to submit further testimony on the latter.
Depositions were taken and.returned to-the court, which made no further decision
on the matter. The plaintiff began this suit on August io, 1928, for a declaratory
judgment that she is the lawful wife of the defendant; that the Paris divorce is
invalid; that the defendant and the woman he married are not husband and wife;
and that they be enjoined from living together. The plaintiff contended that the
authorization she gave to appear in the French action was fraudulently obtained.
The Paris court had found that she appeared voluntarily. The lower court dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, this was affirmed. Since the plaintiff had appeared
voluntarily, she was estoppd from receiving equitable relief in this court.168 It
would seem that the court here exercised its discretion in a sensible manner. Quaere
whether the result would be the same in a case where there was appearance merely
to contest the jurisdiction of the cour' 1 "
Such then are the leading cases dealing with the granting of a declaratory judg-
ment in our typical set-up. For slight variations in situation, see the cases of Dodge
v. Campbell"6 5 and Cesareo v. Cesareo.1 "6 On the whole, the declaratory judgment
has been used rather sparingly in regard to foreign ex parte divorce. This can be
accounted for in several ways. The declaratory judgment procedure in this country
is of comparatively recent growth.161 Again, as we have seen above, 16" foreign
ex parte divorces where there is not co6peration comprise a very small percentage
of our total divorces. And in this small percentage of cases the divorced spouse
frequently is willing to let matters ride without legal action or else resort to some
form of coercive remedy.
How desirable and how effective is this form of relief? The declaratory. judg-
ment would seem to be a desirable remedy in our typical set-up, namely, the attack-
' Carswell, J., at p. 72: "In view of the finding of the trial court; amply sustained, that plaintiff
voluntarily appeared in the French action, it must be held that plaintiff is estoppad from seeking affirmative
equitable relief after having voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Paris court. Her
act in that respect, and her subsequent acts, have brought about the martial complications which she
now seeks to utilize for the granting to her of affirmative relief. '.. Under the circumstances, plaintiff
may not have the benefit of the equitable powers of this court and have awarded to her the affirma-
tive relief she seeks, in an action for a declaratory judgment, the granting of which rests in sound
discretion."
I"See note 63, Jupfr.
IN 128 Misc. 778, ao N. Y. Supp. a6a (19a7) ff'd 2a3 App. Div. 471, 2a8 N. Y. Supp. 6z8
(3928); 135 Misc. 644, 238 N. Y. Supp. 666 (x929), affd 229 App. Div. 534, 242 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1930).
IN 134 Misc. 88, 234 N. Y. Supp. 44 (1gag).
ISee the authorities cited in note 144, sur. 'Note xS, mjpra
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ing of an ex parte foreign divorce. In the first place, by entertaining the suitfor a
declaration, the court can determine amicably the status of the parties without the
necessity of a "hostile" suiti69 Secondly it would seem to be a proper case for the
utilization of the declaratory judgment procedure. The purpose of the declaratory
judgment is to obtain an authoritative definition of certain legal relations. These
relations have here been challenged by the foreign divorce and even more so by the
possible remarriage thereafter. It makes no difference that the foreign divorce is
void and of no effect. Circumstancc§ may still demand an authoritative decision in
regard to it.'70 Especially is this so where a ceremonial marriage has followed the
procurement of the foreign divorce because of the presumption of a strong character
in favor of the validity of such a marriage.17 1 Clear proof is required to overcome
it. Thus, the declaratory judgment would seem to have a definite value in settling
disputed property rights and marital relationships, at least in a jurisdiction other than
the divorce forum,17" 2 and in protecting the interests of the spouse who had no notice
of the divorce proceedings." 3 It seems to protect the spouse whose status has been
placed in question by the action of the other. "The safeguards which have been
set up by the various courts are such as to protect the remedy against abuse,c 1 ' to
confine proper cases to the divorce courts, and to afford a remedy to those for whom
divorce and maintenance actions do not afford the security and relief which they
desire."'175 Te spouse who has no desire for divorce should 6iot be. driven to the
divorce-courts for relief.against the foreign decree. Many reasons. may militate
against the desirability of such action, religious tenets, a lack of belief in divorce, and
many more. Nor should such a spouse be forced to proceed to an action for support.
There are many other things in life besides financial matters. And lastly, the
declaration that the foreign divorce judgment is void would not seem to be an attack
upon the decree of the foreign court. It merely declares that within the declaratory
state, where is the matrimonial domicil of the parties and wherein resides the control
over matters of marriage and divorce, that the ex parte decree is of no effect. Sub.
stantially the same thing is frequently done in the courts of New Jersey and New
York when recognition is refused the foreign decree in some ordinary action.'
'See Sunderland, supra note 44, at 76: "Every case may by this means become, In appearance
at least, a friendly suit ... It makes the law suit a cooperative undertaking." .
1 
'See Lowe v. Lowe, supra note x55; Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 542, 544: "Whether a
given divorce is void is a question upon which expert legal opinion may differ; rights may accrue or be
lost under a divorce of record, afterwards ascertained to be 'void'; evidence available to prove its in-
validity may be lost with the passage of time, and the 'void' divqrce become" a valid AIvorre- ;n pre-
tical effect, enabling the procurer thereof to remarry with safety and so cut off property rights of his
true wife."
SSmee Note (1917) 30 Htmv. L. REv. 5oo.
'In Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 1s, the court purported to determine only the status -of the
parties within the state of New York. See 222 App. Div. 460, 464 (x98a).
"" BoacHARD, op. cit., supra note 144, at 393.
'The discretionary nature of the relief; the requirement of a real "controversy"; the compliance
with the conditions of the usual action, procedural and substantive.
z BoRCHARD, op. Cit., supra note 144, at 393-
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Thus, the declaratory judgment would seem to be a useful weapon with which to
attack invalid foreign divorces. It would seem to be a more desirable method -than
the injunction against the divorce. "The injured spouse is judicially exonerated from
all suspicion of marital misconduct. The offending party is warned that the recip-
rocal rights of the marriage are still alive."1'7
Would a declaratory judgment, such as that in Baumann v. Baumann,177 be en-
titled to recognition elsewhere under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution? While there is no decision upon the point, it is submitted that it
should be so recognized provided the court granting it had jurisdiction. And where
the court granting the declaratory judgment is a court of the matrimonial domicil
of the parties and where the procurer of the foreign divorce has returned thereto
immediately after the divorce, such jurisdiction would seem to be clearly established.
In such a case, the finding that the foreign divorce is void, that the marriage fol-
lowing it is void, and that the parties are husband and wife would seem to be
conclusive.: 8
Would a court, of New York for example, grant a declaratory judgment to the
effect that no cause for divorce exists? Probably not. It certainly would not do so
unless the other spouse lhad started or threatened to bring divorce proceedings else-
where. There is no precedent for a declaratory judgment in this situation.1 79 There
must be a genuine controversy calling for the adjudication of present rights. In any
event, how conclusive would such a declaratory judgment be? It would seem to be
to the effect that no cause for divorce existed within New York state. It would not,
therefore, seem to be res judicata, for instance, in regard to Nevada, where there are
other grounds for divorce.
'"Note (1930) 43 HAxv. L REV. 477, 480: "And yet this relief may be quite inadequate from any
practical point of view. The world will hear for a moment, or not at all, of the declaratory judgment,
but will continue to see the deserted plaintiff, on the one hand, and on thd other, the husband and his
paramour consorting as husband and wife."
'Supra P. 392.
'
T Even if the judgment were not a judicial proceeding, it might still be a "public act" or "record"
within the meaning of Art. IV, St.
Borchard, The Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgmentr (1921) 34 HAxv. L. Rtv. 697, 713: "TM
declaratory judgment, of course, is re$ judicata as to the substantive legal relations involved:'
Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 511, 14o Ad. 5o6 (1928). Moschzisker, C. J.:
"Therefore, our determination of the law governing these facts and of the proper construction to be
given this instrument will make the pending controversy res judicata for all future purposes, between
the present contestants."
i Foster, supra note 22, at 1241, n. 64: "The recent extensive adoption of declaratory judgment acts.
suggest the possibility that the law defendant may request the home state to adjudicate his non-liability,
and that such judgment might bar the further malintenanrc of the action, thus obviating the difficulty
of enforcing injunctions which do not involve passing on the merits. The writer knows of no instance
where this was lone.'
